A special place is reserved in Dante’s inferno for false prophets and fraudulent advisors. The heads of those who pry into the secrets of the future are twisted around so that they can only look into the past. Those who give lousy advice earn their own personal sheath of fire. It’s not a very nice neighborhood. Also in this eighth circle of Hell are corrupt politicians in boiling tar, thieves assailed by snakes, and sowers of discord hacked at by sword-wielding demons.
It appears that the afterlife will be rather unpleasant for all those who predicted: a) the discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s basement; b) a “cakewalk” for the U.S. army in Iraq; c) the spread of democracy from liberated Iraq to the rest of the region; d) a successful surge and a mission finally accomplished.
Media analyst Michael Massing has devoted quite a few essays to the journalists, pundits, advisors, and policymakers who have made advance reservations at the Inferno hotel. In the latest issue of Columbia Journalism Review, he wonders why two pundits who have been spectacularly wrong in their Iraq analysis–Kenneth Pollack and Michael O’Hanlon–have been invited back to dispense more gimcrack advice in The New York Times. Worse, both analysts pretend that they were harsh critics of the Bush administration’s handling of the war when in fact they both supported the decision to invade.
Massing acknowledges that poor analysis should not automatically lead to permanent journalistic unemployment. On the Iraq issue alone, “much of our foreign-policy commentariat would be out on the street,” Massing writes. “Half the columnists at The Washington Post would have to find a new line of work, and The New Republic would probably have to shut down.”
Some organs of the mainstream media–among them The New York Times and The New Republic–have expressed regret for their coverage of the Iraq War, which early on slavishly followed the administration’s line. But these regrets are insufficient. I’m not suggesting that all those who did such lousy crystal-ball gazing should have their heads rotated 180 degrees. But the least that the mainstream media should do is give over more space in their pages to those analysts who have been clear-eyed on the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Getting it Right
Foreign Policy In Focus provided analysis throughout 2002 and 2003 on why invading Iraq was the worst possible policy. We have consistently covered the errors and horrors of occupation. And we continue to publish essays by those who exposed the duplicity and greed of the Bush administration–Dahr Jamail, Phyllis Bennis, Adil Shamoo, Conn Hallinan, Stephen Zunes–long before such critiques became fashionable.
This week at FPIF, we have an excerpt from Dahr Jamail’s new book Beyond the Green Zone. Jamail went to Iraq as a journalist to give the other side of the story: “While the vast majority of the reporting of Iraq was provided by journalists availing themselves of the Pentagon-sponsored ’embed’ program, I chose to look for stories of real life and ’embed’ myself with the Iraqi people. The U.S. military side of the occupation is overly represented by most mainstream outlets. I consciously decided to focus on the Iraqi side of the story.”
In The Surgeon Fails in Iraq, FPIF contributor Adil Shamoo compares the U.S. occupation to a botched surgical operation. “If a surgeon botches an operation, few patients would ask him to stick around and try again,” Shamoo writes. “This is especially true if the operation was elective and the surgeon insisted on performing it. Yet this is exactly how the Bush administration is trying to justify the continued U.S. occupation of Iraq. This time, the administration’s latest addition to the reasons to stay in Iraq is that we have a moral obligation to the Iraqis to prevent them from having a blood bath. What have we given the Iraqis so far–a picnic?”
And FPIF columnist Conn Hallinan probes the moral corruption that sets in after the battle ends and the occupation begins. “An army vanquishes another army, only to find that wars don’t always end when generals surrender and capitals fall. When a few locals take up arms because they object to being occupied by ‘aliens,’ the occupiers act like armies, which are designed to kill people, not to win their hearts and minds,” Hallinan writes in The Algebra of Occupation. “In this process of trying to get the occupied to accept defeat, a certain corruption of spirit begins to seep into the soul of an army, transforming it from a war-fighting machine into a kind of monster.”
Next Stop: Iran?
Rumors of a Bush administration plan to attack Iran have waxed and waned over the last couple years. In a recent issue of Esquire, for instance, two former Bush administration officials confess their growing fears. “When they left the White House, [Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann] left with a growing sense of alarm — not only was the Bush administration headed straight for war with Iran, it had been set on this course for years,” writes John Richardson. “That was what people didn’t realize. It was just like Iraq, when the White House was so eager for war it couldn’t wait for the UN inspectors to leave. The steps have been many and steady and all in the same direction. And now things are getting much worse. We are getting closer and closer to the tripline, they say.”
Zbigniew Brzezinski is certainly worried. No communist dupe or left-wing pacifist, the former national security advisor is urging the Bush administration to cooperate with China on ending the standoff with Iran. China has played a key role in defusing tensions between Washington and Pyongyang, Brzezinski reasons in a recent Washington Post op-ed, so it can be enlisted to help with Tehran as well.
FPIF contributor Reese Erlich is also worried and has a more comprehensive set of suggestions. In his essay U.S. Tells Iran: Become a Nuclear Power, Erlich recommends that Washington stop demonizing Tehran, apologize for U.S. aggression toward the country, return frozen assets, lift all sanctions, begin to reduce U.S. nuclear arsenals, and offer to restore full diplomatic relations. “Then I would do something neither side expects,” Erlich writes in thisexcerpt from his new book, The Iran Agenda. “I would tell them we will phase out our nuclear power reactors for safety reasons and because we can’t safely store nuclear waste. Nuclear power plants in the United States aren’t even hardened against an airplane crash, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission refuses to require it. Then I would suggest that Iran not develop nuclear power.”
Annapolis and Islamabad
Leaders from around the Middle East gathered in Annapolis, Maryland last week to work out a new plan for peace in the region. Some media outlets have touted the agreement to create a democratic Palestinian state by the end of 2008 as a substantial victory. Other observers see yet another set of rhetorical promises unmatched by substantial commitments.
FPIF Middle East editor Stephen Zunes is skeptical that any real change will happen unless the United States fundamentally changes its policy on borders, settlers, and refugees. “If progress seems so unlikely, why is the United States pushing for this summit to go forward?” Zunes asks in Broken Peace Process. “One motivation may simply be for the United States to improve its standing among pro-Western Arab regimes by appearing to be interested in the plight of the Palestinians in order to gain support for the ongoing war in Iraq and increasing threats against Iran.”
Finally, FPIF contributor Saira Yamin dissects the various myths about Pakistan–that it will deliver nukes to terrorists, succumb to rule by fundamentalists, or threaten the United States. “Do Pakistan’s nuclear weapons threaten the United States or Israel?” she asks in Pakistan: Myths and Realities. “In a word, no. Pakistan’s nuclear program is completely India-centric. Its nuclear capability was pursued as a response to India’s own. The Pakistani nuclear doctrine is essentially defensive and has effectively deterred India, with whom it has shared a history of conventional warfare. Furthermore, Pakistani nuclear warheads are kept under tight and enhanced security, especially since charges of nuclear black-marketing were leveled against Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan. There is a two-man rule to authenticate access to nuclear release codes in Pakistan, a standard that is universally employed by nuclear powers. There’s no evidence suggesting that any person or group in Pakistan aspires to use nukes against the United States or its allies.”
FPIF, December 3, 2007