Let me be clear about my preferences.
I would very much like to see Ukraine regain all of its territory, including Crimea. Russia should decisively lose the war that it started. In the best of all possible worlds, Vladimir Putin would be deposed and transferred to The Hague to face charges of war crimes. A more democratic Russia could then be welcomed back into the international community and an expanded European security system.
But this is not the best of all possible worlds—not even close.
Three peace deals are currently on the table to end the war in Ukraine: from Russia, from the United States, and from the Europeans (including Ukraine). Russia’s offer is nakedly imperialist. The U.S. plan is basically capitulation to Russia. And the Europeans offer something close to an authentic compromise.
Is a peace deal to end the three-year conflict even remotely close? If a deal is struck, will Russia resume its war after getting a breather for a year or so? And can the West and Russia avoid another half-century Cold War or, incomparably worse, a world-destroying nuclear war?
Donald Trump thinks that he can push the parties to the negotiating table, achieve an agreement, and walk away with a Nobel Prize that he can wave in Barack Obama’s face. Trump also thought that tweeting “Vladimir, STOP!” would persuade the Russian leader to end his aerial assaults on Ukrainian cities (it didn’t). The U.S. president is thus powerful and delusional. It is a dangerous combination.
But he also might, through no particular diplomatic genius or perhaps because of his powerful delusions, precipitate a deal. Given the various constraints—Russia’s imperialist ambitions, Ukraine’s relative weakness, NATO’s internal divisions, and Trump’s near-desperate desire to fulfill a campaign promise—what is the best agreement that can be salvaged from a very bad situation?
What Russian Wants
The primary obstacle to any peace deal is Putin himself. War is a self-gift that just keeps giving to him: a reason to suppress all dissent, a way to excuse the economic mistakes that his administration has made and the daily sacrifices ordinary Russians are making, and an opportunity to focus all the energies of Russian society on an external adversary (rather than an internal autocrat).
Putin thinks that he’s in the catbird seat—his political position is more-or-less secure, Russia has made incremental progress on the battlefield, the economy is still functioning—so he has instructed his foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, to present uncompromising terms. Russia wants the world to recognize its territorial gains, not just Crimea or the land that Russian troops presently occupy but all of the four Ukrainian provinces it has constitutionally absorbed into the Russian Federation. In other words, Russia wants to grab land with a pen that it hasn’t so far been able to acquire by military force. Although Russia controls nearly all of Luhansk province, it only commands about three-quarters of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia provinces.
Russia wants NATO membership off the table for Ukraine. It also wants the country demilitarized, thus rendering it forever vulnerable to Russian interference and, ultimately, absorption. Lavrov has demanded legislative changes that restore the status of Russian language and culture in Ukrainian society. And, of course, Russia wants the economic sanctions against it lifted immediately.
This isn’t even Putin’s maximalist position. If he can’t occupy all of Ukraine, he wants at least to expand Russian territorial control around Kharkiv in the north and across Ukraine’s southern regions, cutting off the country’s access to the Black Sea. This ambition is consistent with the concept of Novorossiya (“New Russia”), which expands Russia in various directions. Short of Russian soldiers squatting in Kyiv, Putin wants Volodymyr Zelensky replaced by a more Kremlin-friendly leader.
Putin’s ambitions beyond Ukraine are less clear. The expansion of Russian bases near Finland and the Baltics as well as the increase in military capacities that have little to do with the war in Ukraine (hypersonic missiles, an upgraded nuclear arsenal) suggest preparations for a looming conflict with the West.
But how can Putin be preparing to fight NATO when his army couldn’t even subdue Ukrainian forces? Like Trump, he could simply be powerful and delusional. But in fact, despite a plethora of threats, Russia has assiduously avoided direct confrontation with NATO forces. It hasn’t, for instance, bombed supply lines into Ukraine. Although Russia is interfering in European politics—for instance, in the last Romanian presidential election—it doesn’t have the economic base or the military capabilities to take on a modern European military, even one that might in the future be abandoned by Trump’s America.
So, Putin is not likely preparing to attack. But he may well have genuine concerns about being attacked. If Putin had the military power of NATO and he was facing a hobbled superpower like Russia, he would probably launch a preemptive invasion to eliminate a future threat. Putin imagines that other leaders think the same way he does (even when they don’t).
The problem is that Putin isn’t bothering to distinguish the signals he sending about his colonial desire to absorb Ukraine—or at the very least “Finlandize” the country—from his rhetoric about confronting the “Anglo-Saxons,” his preferred label for the threat coming from the West. That doesn’t bode well for Ukraine or the rest of the world.
What Ukraine Wants
The Ukrainian position is quite simple. It wants to regain its lost territory and acquire enough security guarantees to deter future Russian aggression. It needs reconstruction funds. It aspires to join the European Union.
The Europeans have put on the table, with the support of Ukraine, a proposal vastly different from what the Russians offer. There would be no discussions of territorial changes until after an unconditional ceasefire goes into effect. The United States would participate in the monitoring of the ceasefire. There would be no restrictions on the Ukrainian military. In terms of security guarantees, the United States would provide an “Article 5-like agreement,” while NATO membership would remain in play. The coalition of the willing that supports Ukraine could send equipment and troops to Ukrainian territory. Ukraine would regain control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the Kakhovka dam. Ukraine would receive reconstruction assistance while Russia would have to wait for sanctions relief until a stable peace is achieved.
The war has been so devastating for the Ukrainian population and the economy that Kyiv is willing to consider at least temporary territorial concessions in order to end the bloodshed and acquire those elusive security guarantees. A possible compromise would involve Ukraine de facto acknowledging Russian occupation while holding out the hope that a future referendum in those areas could return them to Ukrainian control.
If Ukraine joins the European Union, receives considerable reconstruction assistance, and manages to approach the economic level of a Romania or Bulgaria, then it’s not inconceivable that the current residents of Crimea, the Donbas, or the occupied sections of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would opt for the freedoms of Europe rather than the autocratic mediocrity of Russia.
That is, if the Russian government ever again lets anyone in the lands under its control freely express their preferences.
What Trump Wants
Who knows: it changes from day to day, hour to hour.
What the United States Wants
The consensus in the United States is:
- Russia is the aggressor (including 69 percent of Republicans)
- Russia would violate any agreement reached (including 69 percent of Republicans)
- The conflict is important to U.S. national interests (69 percent of all respondents)
- The United States should not send troops to Ukraine to support its military (70 percent of all respondents)
On pretty much all other questions—providing additional military assistance, supporting Ukrainian membership in NATO, whether the war should end quickly or not—the partisan divide is too wide to identify consensus positions.
The Trump administration has put a proposal on the table that reflects Russian positions: de jure recognition of Crimea by Washington, de facto acceptance of Russian occupation of other territory, NATO off the table, lifting of Russian sanctions, and a new economic relationship with Moscow. Ukraine would get a weak security guarantee, a tiny sliver of Russian occupied territory in Kharkiv province, and some reconstruction aid (maybe). The United States would gain control of the Zaporizhzhia power plant and access to an unknown quantity of Ukrainian minerals.
But even within the Trump administration, there are differing positions. Steven Witkoff—ostensibly the envoy to the Middle East, so what’s he doing in Moscow?—seems eager to be Putin’s best American friend. He’s also one of Trump’s oldest buddies, so he’s become a conduit for the Kremlin propaganda poured into the president’s ear. He’s also the U.S. representative most responsible for the administration’s latest peace deal.
Keith Kellogg, who’s the actual envoy for Russia and Ukraine, seems to have a better grasp of the geopolitical stakes. So, obviously, he’s been excluded from some of the high-level negotiations, presumably because the Kremlin considers him “too pro-Ukraine.” Kellogg came up with a territorial carve-up similar to the zones imposed on Germany (and Berlin) after the end of World War II. He was quick to follow up with a comment that he wasn’t recommending the partition of Ukraine (no?).
Some Republican members of Congress still haven’t jumped on the pro-Russia bandwagon. But they are pushing back against Kremlin mouthpieces largely behind closed doors.
What Comes Next?
The Trump administration could give up on a peace deal in the face of Putin’s intransigence, which it has threatened to do on several occasions. The Ukrainians could dig in their heels on the issue of insufficient security guarantees or territorial concessions. The Russians could redouble their current spring offensive—Putin’s illusory ceasefires notwithstanding—and push to acquire as much territory militarily before returning to the negotiating table in the late fall to try once again to get diplomatically what it couldn’t get by force.
But let’s say that the stars somehow align. Here’s a 10-point plan that all sides might agree on:
- A “permanent ceasefire” along the line of fire as well as by air and sea
- The United States recognizes Crimea as Russian territory
- Ukraine recognizes Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, as de facto but not de jure
- NATO is off the table for the foreseeable future
- Ukrainian membership in the European Union is fast-tracked
- Ukraine has unfettered freedom to upgrade its military
- The “coalition of the willing” of mostly European countries monitors the ceasefire along a demilitarized zone and deploys a limited peacekeeping force in Ukrainian territory
- Russia receives sanction relief after all other aspects of the agreement are implemented
- Ukraine receives economic assistance, part of which comes from Russia’s frozen assets in the West and which is also used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories
- Ukraine determines the timing and nature of its elections
Compare this list to my ideal preferences at the top of this article and obviously I’d be disappointed with such a deal. But it would satisfy some of the demands of both sides while providing some slender safeguards that the war wouldn’t just break out again after a few months. Now let’s see if Trump will impose Russian terms on Ukraine, get fed up with notoriously difficult peace negotiations, or somehow facilitate a deal that makes the best of a bad situation.
FPIF, April 30, 2025